When presenting
the draft budget, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance unanimously claimed that
it is the most austere budget in the history of the Slovak Republic. Allow me
to disagree. It is built on several assumptions that raise
serious concerns about the future stable development of public finances, and
about macroeconomic balance as well.
The general government deficit, that is the deficit of public finances as a whole, is set for 2009 at 1.7% of GDP. Compared with 2008, for which, according to the Ministry of Finance's latest estimates, a deficit of 2.2% of GDP is expected, this represents a reduction of 0.5% of GDP. This means that the government formally meets the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, which calls for reducing the deficit at a pace of 0.5% of GDP a year.
There is, however, a catch. On the revenue side of the budget, the government is relying on one-off operations totalling 0.5% of GDP. These consist of the assumed departure of 150 thousand savers from the 2nd pillar, which should bring a one-off 0.3% of GDP into the budget. Instead of waiting in the savers' accounts until they retire and being invested in the meantime, this money will thus go straight into consumption. Another item is revenue from the sale of state property (of several ministries and the Environmental Fund), from which the government expects 0.2% of GDP. Without these "one-offs", the deficit reduction would be zero.
The situation looks even worse if we look at the deficit excluding the impact of the 2nd pillar. The pillar was introduced above all so that the government would not spend a certain part of the money straight away, but so that savers would put it aside in their own accounts for the future. This part was originally estimated at 1.2% of GDP, but owing to the assumed departure of 150 thousand savers from the 2nd pillar it was reduced to 1.0% of GDP. This means that 0.2% of GDP will not be used to reduce the government's future liabilities to citizens – future pensioners – but will be consumed. The deficit excluding the impact of the 2nd pillar should therefore fall from 1.0% (2.2 – 1.2) to 0.7% of GDP (1.7 – 1.0), i.e. by only 0.3% of GDP. Without the above-mentioned "one-offs", there would be no reduction but, on the contrary, an increase in the deficit of 0.2% of GDP.
|
(% of GDP) |
2008 budget |
2008 expected |
2009 original draft |
2009 budget |
2009 without one-offs |
|
General government revenue |
33.7 |
? |
33.5 |
34.4 |
33.9 |
|
General government expenditure |
36.0 |
? |
35.2 |
36.1 |
36.1 |
|
General government deficit |
-2.3 |
-2.2 |
-1.7 |
-1.7 |
-2.2 |
|
Of which impact of the 2nd pillar |
-1.2 |
-1.2 |
-1.2 |
-1.0 |
-1.0 |
|
Deficit excluding the 2nd pillar |
-1.1 |
-1.0 |
-0.5 |
-0.7 |
-1.2 |
A critic might say that this logic is far-fetched. One must realise, however, that one-off revenue will hardly be repeated in the future, unlike the increase in ministries' expenditure it is financing. Likewise, shrinking the 2nd pillar means nothing other than preferring immediate public consumption at the cost of shifting the problem of the pension system into the future.
If we add to this the uncertainty about whether the economic growth forecasts, and hence tax revenue, will be met, and the massive motorway-building programme through PPP projects – through which 2.0 to 3.0% of GDP a year is to be poured into the economy over the coming years outside the budget (and thus outside the deficit) – we get a fairly vivid picture of the scale of the fiscal expansion that the current government is preparing for us.
The defence offered by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, that in a time of crisis the government should replace the slowdown in economic growth with additional public expenditure, does not hold up. One must realise that, despite the global financial crisis, Slovakia is not in recession. If anything can derail our growth, it is precisely irresponsible economic policy. Even under Mečiar's government in 1994 to 1998 the economy grew relatively fast, mainly as a result of pumping money into the economy through the public budget. The question, however, is: was it worth it? The consequence of such a policy was an overheating of the economy accompanied by a dramatic rise in interest rates and a subsequent halt to its growth. Stabilisation was achieved only by the unpopular package of measures adopted after the first Dzurinda government took office.
Instead of inventing accounting tricks to inflate expenditure without increasing the deficit, the government should rather focus on making markets more flexible (competition, information) and on making the investment environment more attractive. Only in this way can economic growth be kept high over a long period. The politicians' priority enemies should therefore be high social contributions (reform of the 1st pillar), slow courts and a poor-quality education system. In the euro area – in the absence of an own monetary policy – any remedial measures would be an order of magnitude more complicated.
Ján Marušinec